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The Subjectively Expected Utility Max-
imization Model
In 1738 Daniel Bernoulli, puzzled about
why people buy insurance even though in-
surance companies must take in more
money as premiums than they pay out in
benefits, proposed a theory of decision-
making which asserts that people choose
among risky courses of action in such a
way as to maximize their expected utility
(Bernoulli, 1738; Sommer, 1954). The
word utility is a name for the concept of
subjective value, which may be quite dif-
ferent from objective or dollar value. This
theory was put into modem and sophisti-
cated mathematical form in 1944 by von
Neumann and Morgenstern in their famous
book, Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1957). During the remainder of the ’40s
and the early ’50s it attracted an increasing
amount of theoretical attention and a small
amount of experimental attention as well.
Unfortunately, the theory did not hold up
very well under experimental analysis. The
difficulty seemed to be that people made
decisions in risky situations on the basis of
the probabilities as they perceived them,
rather than the objective probabilities. This
experimental finding, combined with the
difficulties which arise for an expected
utility maximization model when objective
probabilities cannot be meaningfully de-
fined, led several theorists to propose a
new theory, which asserts that people
choose among risky courses of action in
such a way as to maximize what has come
to be called subjectively expected utility.
The subjectively expected utility of a course
of action is defined as follows:
where there are n possible outcomes of the
course of action, the first outcome has util-
ity ul and subjective probability tf¡1, and so
on. Although a number of psychologists
have expressed some severe reservations
about the merits of this model in the face
1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper
presented at the meetings of the American Psy-
chological Association, Chicago, September 1,
1960 as part of a symposium entitled "The ef-
fect of the value of a reinforcement on subjec-
tive probability." I am grateful to the other
speakers in the symposium, especially to F. W.
Irwin, L. Littig, and R. D. Luce, for comment
and criticism, some of which is reflected in the
revision. This work was sponsored by the
United States Air Force under Contract AF49
(638)-769, monitored by the Air Force Office
of Scientific Research of the Air Force Office
of Aerospace Research, and carries Document
No. AFOSR-1709.
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of the data, it remains the dominant model
for static decision-making to this day-al-
though nowadays it is usually complicated
by a stochastic formulation which causes it
to predict a probability that one course of
action will be preferred to another, rather
than a choice. For reviews of this litera-
ture, see (Edwards, 1954d, 1961).
Non-independence of Values and Prob-
abilities
One important feature of the subjectively
expected utility maximization model is that
the utilities are ordinarily assumed to be
functions only of the possible outcomes of
the course of action, while the subjective
probabilities are ordinarily assumed to be
functions only of the objective probabilities
of those outcomes. Neither of these as-
sumptions is necessary to the mathematical
content of the model itself, but it is very
difficult to see how the model could be
applied to real decisions unless some such
assumptions were made. Nevertheless, a
number of people have proposed that util-
ity is determined both by objective proba-
bility and by objective value, and that sub-
jective probability is also determined both
by objective probability and by objective
value.
Specifically, two propositions of this sort
have been defended. One asserts that an
outcome which has a low probability will,
by virtue of that low probability, have a
higher value or utility than the same out-
come would have if it had a high proba-
bility. The assertion that the grass is
greener on the other side of the fence em-
bodies the essence of this proposition. Since
this hypothesis was originally brought to
prominence in psychology by Kurt Lewin
and his students, I will call it the Lewin
utility theory. The other common proposi-
tion concerns the determiners of subjective
probability; it says that people will overes-
timate the likeliness of desirable events
and underestimate the likeliness of unde-
sirable ones. A number of psychologists
have proposed this second hypothesis in one
form or another. Since Francis W. Irwin is
an early and effective proponent of this
view, I shall call it the Irwin subjective
probability theory (Irwin, 1953). It is im-
portant to note that although both of these
theories are inconsistent with the simple
version of the SEU maximization model,
they are nevertheless two completely inde-
pendent theories; either one could be cor-
rect while the other was wrong.
Before evaluating the validity of the
Lewin utility theory and the Irwin subjec-
tive probability theory, we must first de-
cide what the simpler hypothesis is with
which both of these theories disagree. This
is not as easy as it sounds. Unfortunately,
neither subjective probability nor utility is
usually conceived of as directly observable,
or even as easily inferred from observations.
We usually suppose that choices among
risky courses of action are determined by
both utilities and subjective probabilities,
and we then attempt to infer appropriate
values of these quantities to account for
observed sets of choices. Since we permit
considerable arbitrariness in determining
utility and subjective probability values, it
takes some substantial set of observations,
very carefully chosen, to obtain a contra-
diction of the SEU model. Without dis-
cussing the evidence in detail, I would like
to assert that I know of no experiment in
the psychological literature, including Ir-
win’s recent one (personal communication),
which cannot be explained in terms of ap-
propriate utility and subjective probability
functions. Consequently I am compelled
to argue that no evidence against the SEU
model and in favor of either the Lewin util-
ity theory or the Irwin subjective proba-
bility theory exists.
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I do not consider this fact to be in favor
of the SEU model, however. What it
means is that the SEU model, in the form
in which it has usually been defended, is
so vague that it is almost impossible to find
a reasonable pattern of behavior which is
inconsistent with it.2 The SEU model can
be made sufficiently specific so that it re-
ally means something only by specifying
the forms of the utility and subjective prob-
ability functions which enter into it, or
(what amounts to the same thing) by spec-
ifying some operations by which utilities
and subjective probabilities can be meas-
ured independently of the decisions they
are supposed to predict. Just such a devel-
opment is now in progress. Direct psycho-
physical methods are being applied to the
measurement both of utility and of subjec-
tive probability. So far the results of using
such directly obtained utility and subjec-
tive probability functions to predict deci-
sions among bets have not been very favor-
able to SEU models. Unfortunately, they
are not very favorable to the Lewin or Ir-
win theories either. Such experiments seem
to show that the utility of money is more or
less linear with its dollar value (for small
amounts of money, at any rate), and that
the estimated probability associated with a
suitable probability display is very close to
linear with the objective probability being
displayed. In short, the data indicate that
people perceive both values and probabil-
ities correctly. Nevertheless, they do not
make decisions which maximize objective
expected value, so it must be concluded
that although they perceive values and
probabilities correctly, they use them incor-
rectly. In other words, on this interpreta-
tion it is the mathematical form of the SEU
model, rather than the links between it and
the real world of choices, which is at fault.
(This argument is spelled out in detail in
[Edwards, 1962]). I will discuss a specific
hypothesis about how the mathematical
form of the SEU model is at fault and how
to correct it later in this paper.
Evidence Concerning Non-independence
So far I have been treating the Lewin
utility theory and the Irwin subjective
probability theory as though they were al-
ternatives to the SEU maximization model,
to be adopted only if the SEU maximiza-
tion model turns out not to work. But they
can equally well be considered as models in
their own right, to be used independently
of the SEU model. When they are thought
of in that way, a substantial amount of evi-
dence bearing on them is available.
First, consider the evidence for the Ir-
win subjective probability theory. The re-
sults of several experiments show that peo-
ple consider an event more likely to occur
if its consequences are favorable than if its
consequences are unfavorable ( Crandall,
Solomon, and Kellaway, 1955; Irwin, 1953;
Marks, 1951). Some of the data from my
probability preference experiments indicate
more or less the same thing (Edwards,
1953, 1954a, 1954b). In those experiments
subjects were asked to make choices from
pairs of bets. Both members of each pair
had the same expected value, so there was
never any objective reason for preferring
one bet to the other. Figure 1 shows the
results for positive expected value bets.
The y-axis is a measure of the extent to
which various bets are preferred, and the
x-axis is the probability of winning of the
bets. It is evident that people particularly
like the 50-50 bet and particularly do not
2 Since this paper was written, I have re-
ported (Edwards, 1962) a deduction from the
SEU model so specific that it would be very
easy to find data which violate it, which as-
sumes nothing but continuity and monotonicity
of utility and subjective probability functions.
This implies that the SEU model is more vul-
nerable than I realized in 1960.
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FIG. 1. Preference as a function of probability for
positive expected value bets. (Reproduced by per-
mission from Edwards, 1953, p. 355).
like the 6/8 bet; these findings are highly
reproducible. Figure 2 shows the same in-
formation for negative expected value bets.
Here the outstanding finding is that people
prefer relatively low probabilities of losing
(and relatively high amounts of loss) and
avoid relatively high probabilities of losing,
and relatively small amounts of loss. These
findings would be consistent with the hy-
pothesis that people considered an event
with a negative expected value to be less
likely than the same event with a positive
expected value, although of course they do
not prove that hypothesis.
Another form of evidence comes from an
experiment in which I actually obtained
utility and subjective probability functions
(Edwards, 1955). Again subjects made
choices among bets, and these functions
were inferred from their choices. The
method used depended on a rather doubt-
ful assumption, but the data obtained in
the experiment provided internal consis-
tency checks on the assumption which
worked pretty well, so I have some confi-
dence in the data even though I do not like
the assumption used to obtain them. The
data relevant to the Irwin subjective prob-
ability theory are presented in Figure 3.
Ten subjective probability functions, two
for each of five subjects, are shown. For
each subject, one curve is his subjective
probability function inferred from positive
expected value bets and the other is his
subjective probability function inferred
from negative expected value bets. It is ap-
parent that most subjects remained pretty
objective when choosing among negative
expected value bets, but were over-opti-
mistic when choosing among positive ex-
pected value bets.
A Conclusion about the Iruin Subjective
Probability Theory
All of these findings strongly indicate
that there is at least an interaction between
the sign of the utility of a bet and the
subjective probability associated with the
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Fic. 2. Preference as a function of probability for
negative expected value bets. (Reproduced by per-
mission from Edwards, 1953, p. 355.)
event (note that the utility must be meas-
ured on a ratio scale for this statement to
be meaningful, and zero utility must be
where you now are). Furthermore, the di-
rection of the effects is in general the direc-
tion predicted by the Irwin subjective prob-
ability theory. None of the evidence, how-
ever, indicates an interaction between value
and subjective probability provided that the
signs of the utilities involved do not change.
This is fortunate for the SEU model. It is
not too difficult to think of an SEU model
which requires up to five different func-
tions relating subjective to objective prob-
ability, depending on the signs of the utili-
ties involved. One such function might ap-
ply when all utilities were positive, another
when the lowest utility was zero, a third
when both positive and negative utilities
were present, a fourth when the highest
utility was zero, and a fifth when all utili-
ties were negative. Some of the data on
zero expected value bets suggests that
there may be little or no difference between
the first two or three of these cases. But I
do not see how to formulate a model which
would permit the dependence of subjective
probability on amounts, as well as signs, of
utilities. And I know of no evidence which
requires anything more than interaction
with sign. So, for the time being, perhaps
we can afford to assume that the Irwin
subjective probability theory is right, but
that the dependence of subjective proba-
bility is on signs of utilities rather than on
their values.
Atkinson’s Form of the Lewin Utility
Theory
Now consider the Lewin utility theory.
I don’t propose to examine it in Lewin’s
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FIG. 3. Subjective probability as a function of objective probability and
sign of expected value. (Reproduced by permission from Edwards, 1955, p.
208.)
48
form; instead, I will take the model which
Atkinson has proposed as my point of de-
parture (Atkinson, 1957; Atkinson, Bas-
tian, Earl, and Litwin, 1960). Atkinson
believes that in situations in which a per-
son perceives the outcome of a risky act as
contingent on his skill, the variables which
will control his decision are the motive to
achieve success (M a), the motive to avoid
failure (Mf), the subjective probabilities of
achieving success and avoiding failure (P8 a
and P f) and the incentive values of achiev-
ing success and avoiding failure (1, and I f).
He combines these six determiners of de-
cisions into a single resultant motivation by
simple multiplication; his equation for re-
sultant motivation is:
Now Atkinson’s crucial assumption is that
the attractiveness of success is a positive
linear function of task difficulty, and simi-
larly that the attractiveness of failure, al-
ways a minus quantity, becomes increas-
ingly negative for easier tasks. In symbols:
It follows that Atkinson’s equation for re-
sultant motivation can be rewritten as fol-
lows :
You may already have noticed an interest-
ing similarity between this equation for re-
sultant motivation and a familiar statistical
quantity: the variance of a two-outcome
bet. If you can win $A with probability p
and win $B with probability 1- p, then the
variance of the bet is
The only structural difference between the
equation for variance and Atkinson’s equa-
tion for resultant motivation is that in At-
kinson’s equation the difference between
the two motives is not squared. This means
that Atkinson’s resultant motivation can be
negative, while of course a variance cannot
be less than zero.
Variance Preferences
This structural similarity suggests that
Atkinson’s model, though not couched in
that language, is in fact a suggestion that
people may in choosing among bets base
their preferences not only on the first mo-
ment of the distribution of outcomes (the
mean, or expected value, or SEU), but also
on higher moments of the distribution.
That suggestion has been made before; in
fact, it has been perhaps the most persist-
ent criticism of the school of thought about
utility maximization which was started by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (Allais,
1953). In 1954 I published an experiment
addressed to the question, which concluded
that variance preferences do indeed exist,
but are minor in importance compared with
utility and subjective probability as deter-
miners of choices among bets (Edwards,
1954c). More recently, Coombs and Pru-
itt have performed an experiment in which
they asked subjects to make choices from
pairs of imaginary bets of fixed expected
value which varied in variance and in
skewness (Coombs and Pruitt, 1960). Data
were rejected if they failed to satisfy weak
stochastic transitivity, which is a fairly le-
nient kind of assumption that if A is pre-
ferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A
ought to be preferred to C at least 50 per
cent of the time. The remaining data were
analyzed according to Coombs’ unfolding
technique. The major findings were that
most subjects chose consistently and transi-
tively and that most subjects exhibited sin-
gle-peaked variance preferences and (ex-
cept for an undue preference for 50-50
bets) single-peaked skewness or probabil-
ity preferences. The consistency found by
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Coombs and Pruitt was extraordinarily
high; perhaps it is because their subjects
made their choices among these imaginary
bets at rates ranging from 3.4 to 22.4
choices per minute, and so cannot have
taken much time for reflection. The two
rules &dquo;Always choose the bet with the high-
est payoff for winning&dquo; and &dquo;Always choose
the bet with the lowest cost for losing&dquo; to-
gether account for about 68 per cent of all
the rank orderings Coombs and Pruitt ob-
tained ; these rules, of course, could be ap-
plied simply and mechanically to minimize
thought. It has been shown (Slovic, Lich-
tenstein, and Edwards, forthcoming) that
more complex preference patterns, less eas-
ily interpreted as variance preferences, occur
when subjects make more careful choices,
but of course this finding is not evidence
against variance preferences; in fact, the
evidence suggests that they do exist, but
not in the single-peaked form hypothesized
by Coombs and Pruitt.
Unfortunately, for any bet which has
only two outcomes, skewness is completely
confounded with probability of winning
and variance is completely confounded with
utility. Consequently any experiment de-
signed to examine variance preferences un-
equivocally must use bets with more than
two possible outcomes. So neither my ear-
lier experiment nor the Coombs-Pruitt ex-
periment nor the Slovic-Lichtenstein-Ed-
wards experiment has anything definitive
to say about the existence or relative size
of variance preferences. Nevertheless, it
seems intuitively plausible that such pref-
erences exist, and Atkinson’s theory can be
reinterpreted very simply to be an asser-
tion that people with high need for achieve-
ment and low need to avoid failure should
prefer high-variance bets, while people with
low need for achievement and high need to
avoid failure should prefer low-variance
bets-a hypothesis which is supported by a
substantial amount of data.
A Conclusion Concerning the Lewin
Utility Theory
If variance preferences exist, then the
SEU model is not very useful in predicting
choices. But the notions of utility and sub-
jective probability are necessary aside from
their use in SEU models. People do make
judgments about the values of things, and
they do make judgments about the likeli-
ness of events. These judgments can con-
veniently be called utilities and subjective
probabilities, regardless of the usefulness or
lack of usefulness of the SEU maximization
model. But the Lewin utility theory says
more than that variance preferences exist.
It asserts that objects which are harder to
obtain are more valuable than those which
are easier to obtain. This hypothesis has
meaning independent of choices among
risky courses of action. But I am unclear,
and have been unable to find out from the
literature, which of two possible interpreta-
tions of this statement is intended by those
who make it. One interpretation simply
asserts that our world is so constructed that
the more desirable objects are harder to
get. I feel confident that this is so, but I
see no reason why this fact should be in-
terpreted as a theory of behavior. It is
instead a theory about the environment in
which behavior takes place. The other pos-
sible interpretation is that exactly the same
object is more valuable when it is hard to
obtain than when it is easy to obtain. This
hypothesis is intuitively plausible, but I
know of no very convincing evidence that
it is correct.
Early in this paper, I said that the Lewin
utility theory is summarized by the proverb
&dquo;The grass is greener on the other side of
the fence.&dquo; I am now saying that there are
two possible interpretations of this proverb.
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One is that the grass is really the same on
both sides, but looks greener over there.
The other, which seems to me more plaus-
ible, is that the grass is in fact greener over
there-and indeed they put up the fence in
the first place just to keep it that way. Un-
til evidence against the second of these two
interpretations accumulates, I find it more
persuasive than the first.
Summary
The subjectively expected utility maxi-
mization model, currently the dominant
static model about how men make risky de-
cisions, rests on the concepts of utility or
subjective value, assumed to be a function
only of amount and nature of the valued
object, and subjective probability, assumed
to be a function only of amount and display
or means of realization of objective proba-
bility. But evidence, anecdotal and experi-
mental, suggests that human judgments of
value are affected by probability of obtain-
ing the valued object, and human judg-
ments of probability are affected by value
of the possible payoffs of the risky course
of action. Two specific theories of this sort
are considered. The Irwin subjective prob-
ability theory asserts that people will over-
estimate the likeliness of desirable events
and underestimate the likeliness of unde-
sirable events. Review of relevant data in-
dicates that such an interaction indeed
occurs, but that it is only with the signs,
not with the amounts, of the possible pay-
offs. The Lewin utility theory asserts that
an outcome with a low probability will
have a higher value than the same outcome
would have if it had a high probability. A
specific version of this point of view pro-
posed by Atkinson is reviewed and found
to resemble closely the hypothesis that
choices among risky courses of action de-
pend on the variance as well as the ex-
pected value of each course. Evidence for
such variance preferences is reviewed. It
is concluded that the favorable evidence
concerning variance preferences casts seri-
ous doubts on the validity of the subjec-
tively expected utility maximization model.
But judgments of value can occur inde-
pendently of decisions, and so the Lewin
utility theory is important even if the sub-
jectively expected utility maximization
model is wrong. The question is raised
whether the attractiveness of improbable
achievements is not a characteristic of the
environment rather than of judgments of
value. Doesn’t the grass seem greener on
the other side of the fence because it is
greener, and wasn’t the fence erected to
keep it that way?
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